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LOWERING THE BAR?: REEVALUATING THE DILIGENT
PROSECUTION BAR IN LIGHT OF THE
GOLD KING MINE SPILL
In August 2015, the Gold King Mine spewed three million gal-
lons of wastewater into rivers throughout the southwest United
States.1  The mine, tainted with a variety of material, dyed long
stretches of water an “eerie orange-yellow” not unlike a Hollywood
drama film.2  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-
vealed that one of its crews ultimately triggered the spill, causing
widespread damage to wells, crops, and pastures.3  The EPA initially
assured those harmed it would repay their damages, but announced
in January 2017 it would not repay claims for economic damages.4
The sum of the seventy-three claims filed was over 1.2 billion
dollars.5
In justifying its decision, the EPA claimed the Federal Tort
Claims Act did not allow them to repay claims resulting from discre-
tionary government actions.6  Rather, EPA spokespersons asserted
Congress designed the law to protect the decision-making ability of
government agencies against threatened litigation.7  Many ex-
pressed outrage at the EPA’s decision, including several members
of Congress.8  The State of Utah, among others, filed suit against
the EPA in an effort to recover these damages.9  As of the date of
1. See Associated Press, EPA Says it Won’t Repay Claims for Spill That Caused Yel-
low Rivers, CBS NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gold-king-
mine-spill-colorado-rivers-epa-claims (describing environmental damage caused by
spill).
2. Id. (clarifying effects of environmental damage to rivers throughout spill
area).
3. Dan Elliott, EPA says it can’t pay economic damages from mine spill, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://apnews.com/a8ae2e2996d745a3944912968742a94
8/apnewsbreak-epa-says-it-cant-pay-damages-mine-spill (assessing responsibility for
mine spill).
4. Id. (describing actions of EPA in wake of incident).
5. Id. (explaining sum of claims filed against EPA).  A variety of private prop-
erty owners, including farmers, rafting companies, and homeowners, filed claims.
Id.
6. January 13, 2017 Decision, DECISION ON FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT CLAIMS
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/decision-federal-tort-claims-
act-claims (announcing decision and reasoning underlying lack of repayment).
7. See id. (describing EPA’s interpretation of Congress’s intent in extending
sovereign immunity under FTCA).
8. Elliott, supra note 3 (explaining various reactions of congressmen).
9. Associated Press, 2 Years After a Huge Colorado Mine Spill Polluted Utah Rivers,
the State is Suing the EPA, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.sltrib
(77)
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this Comment, the various cases have been consolidated by the Ju-
dicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation into a singular action in the
District of New Mexico.10
In addition to the state of Utah, many private citizens also had
claims to bring against the EPA.11  Though the EPA claimed sover-
eign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, there is potential
for a cause of action under the Solid Waste Disposal Act.12  This act,
like most environmental acts, provides an avenue for citizens to
bring their suits.13  Under the Eleventh Amendment, a private citi-
zen cannot sue a government entity without the legislature creating
a private cause of action.14  Environmental statutes, such as the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, create private rights of action for environ-
mental harm covered under each statute.15  Still, private citizens
may encounter additional stumbling blocks to recovery in the form
of diligent prosecution bars, which are prolific within environmen-
tal statutes.16  The bar prevents citizen suits when the government is
diligently pursuing action against the offender in a court of law.17
This includes completed government actions in which some form
of decree or order has been entered against the offender.18  Courts
justify the existence of the bars with the rationalization that citizen
suits are secondary to government action.19
.com/news/environment/2018/01/06/2-years-after-a-huge-colorado-mine-spill-
that-polluted-utah-rivers-the-state-is-suing-the-epa (describing actions of Utah in re-
lation to mine spill).
10. In re Gold King Mine Release in San Juan Cty., 291 F. Supp. 3d 1373, 1375
(J.P.M.L. 2018) (consolidating pending cases into singular action).
11. Elliott, supra note 3 (describing variety of claims brought by private land
owners).
12. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1984) (providing for citizen suits for viola-
tion of waste disposal standards).
13. Id. (creating cause of action for citizen suits); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(2012) (creating action for violation of Clean Water Act).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (limiting jurisdiction of federal courts).  The
Supreme Court clarified that the Eleventh Amendment reflects a broader princi-
ple of sovereign immunity, and states could not be subjected to private suits as
means of obtaining plantiff’s objectives. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (mirroring private right of action present in most
environmental statutes).
16. See § 6972 (b)(1)(B) (describing provision referred to as diligent prosecu-
tion bar).
17. Id. (limiting extent of suits by private citizens).
18. See id. (specifying action prohibited when compliance with order is being
pursued).
19. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987) (describ-
ing purpose of citizen suits as matter of policy).
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This Comment will explore whether the diligent prosecution
bar best serves the interests of citizens.20  Despite claims that the
government is best suited to enforce environmental action, the ac-
tions by the EPA in the Gold King Mine case demonstrate how gov-
ernment can cause environmental destruction.21  This Comment
will analyze the diligent prosecution bar for three different environ-
mental acts and how courts have applied it.22  This Comment will
further decide whether the bar truly benefits citizens or overly in-
hibits citizens from vindicating their interests.23
I. DEPTHS OF THE MINE: THE BACKGROUND OF THE
DILIGENT PROSECUTION BAR
The diligent prosecution bar is a provision in all environmen-
tal acts.24  Environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions,
which allow private citizens to launch civil suits to redress harms
arising from environmental pollution or other damages.25  While
the type of pollution covered varies from act to act, the provisions
of the diligent prosecution bar remain the same.26  The bar pre-
vents citizens from filing suit when the federal or state government
is diligently prosecuting an environmental offender.27
The Supreme Court has stated citizen suits should be secon-
dary to government enforcement.28  They should not overshadow
or replace action by the government in enforcing environmental
law.29  This section of the Comment will examine the diligent pros-
ecution bar within three different environmental acts and the sub-
20. See infra notes 103-211 and accompanying text (examining policy behind
diligent prosecution bar and effects upon citizens).
21. Associated Press, supra note 1 (noting EPA is responsible for spillage into
rivers).
22. See infra notes 24-102 and accompanying text (describing effect of each
statute and courts’ analyses and interpretations of statute’s text).
23. See infra notes 212-251 and accompanying text (suggesting future inter-
pretation of diligent prosecution bar and most beneficial use).
24. Peter A. Appel, The Diligent Prosecution Bar to Citizen Suits: The Search for
Adequate Representation, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 91 (2003) (noting presence of diligent
prosecution bar in all environmental statutes).
25. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972) (describing role of
citizen suits as private attorney generals in environmental context).
26. See infra notes 32-102 and accompanying text (noting similarity of bar in
all three statutes)
27. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012) (preventing suit under certain
circumstances).
28. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (finding
private action unnecessary where government already commenced action).
29. See id. at 60 (explaining citizen action should be deferential to
government).
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sequent history since Congress adopted the acts.30  While the Clean
Water Act has one of the most comprehensive diligent prosecution
bars, each of the acts examined has case history further defining
the bar’s application and the subsequent impact.31
A. Clean Water Act
Congress first enacted the Water Pollution Prevention and
Control Act in 1948.32  The law is comprehensive, providing goals
for research, grants for construction projects, and overall regulatory
standards.33  Congress subsequently passed the Clean Water Act in
1972 as a series of amendments to the Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act.34  These amendments contained the citizen suit
provisions common to most environmental statutes.35  The provi-
sion creates a cause of action against another individual or govern-
ment actors who violate the Act’s standards.36  Alternatively, the
provision allows suit against the EPA Administrator when they alleg-
edly fail to complete a non-discretionary duty under the Act.37
Within the Act’s citizen suit provisions, there is also the dili-
gent prosecution bar.38  It provides no action may be commenced if
the government “is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action
in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance
with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a
court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of
right.”39  Another provision notes the prosecution bar does not in-
hibit the common law rights of citizens.40  Legal scholars consider
30. See infra notes 32-102 and accompanying text (analyzing history of bar
within three different statutes).
31. See infra notes 32-102 and accompanying text (examining bar within three
different statutes and interpretation by courts).
32. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012) (stating purpose of restoring and
maintaining clean waterways).
33. See generally §§ 1251-1377 (setting forth substantive provisions).
34. Appel, supra note 24, at 94 (describing history of Clean Water Act).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(B) (2012) (describing diligent prosecution bar).
36. § 1365 (explaining when citizens can sue).
37. § 1365(a)(2) (setting up alternate means of suit). The Administrator re-
fers to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency who is given
authority to administer the provisions of the law. § 1251(d).
38. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (describing how suit might be barred from action).
39. Id. (detailing conditions for stoppage of suit).
40. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2012) (listing broad exception to other provi-
sions of citizen suits).
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the diligent prosecution bar here as one of the more comprehen-
sive among environmental statutes.41
The United States Supreme Court and circuit courts have clari-
fied several provisions of the Act’s diligent prosecution bar.42  In a
1987 decision, the Supreme Court noted citizen suits were no
longer necessary if the government is pursuing action against the
offender.43  In the same decision, the Supreme Court continued to
note the primary role of citizen suits is to “supplement rather than
to supplant government action.”44  The Court elaborated that the
legislative history supports this viewpoint and this prevents suits for
past violations of the Act.45  This belies a belief that citizens suing
on top of government enforcement would only be intrusive.46  The
Court found this would curtail the effective enforcement power of
the government.47  More recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals further added that the diligent prosecution bar is not a juris-
dictional requirement.48  This is largely a matter of civil procedure,
determining whether a federal court would have jurisdiction to
hear a citizen suit under the Act.49  The greater importance of this
decision is the  motion to dismiss is proper for a defendant to file.50
While courts agree the bar is not a jurisdictional requirement,
the circuit courts remain split on what constitutes a diligent prose-
cution.51  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals embraces a narrow
41. See Appel, supra note 24, at 92 (describing bar of Clean Water Act as most
extensive).
42. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (examining development of
diligent prosecution bar under courts rulings).
43. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987) (noting
legislature intended for State government to enforce majority of violations).
44. Id. at 60 (defining relation of citizen suits to government action).
45. See id. at 60-62 (furthering background in support of citizen suits’ minor
role).
46. See id. at 61 (correcting false beliefs of respondents in case).
47. Id. (arguing government power would be weakened by other interpreta-
tion of law).
48. See generally Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d
737, 747-49 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing why diligent prosecution bar was not in-
tended to be jurisdictional requirement).
49. See id. at 745 (explaining implications of deciding whether bar is
jurisdictional).
50. See id. (describing evidentiary inferences granted if bar is not jurisdic-
tional); see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (creating basis for motions to dismiss in
federal court).
51. See Patrick Kurtas, Lowering The Bar: The Sixth Circuit Embraces The Ninth
Circuit’s Narrow Interpretation Of Section 1319(g)(6) Of The Clean Water Act in Rudolph
Jones, Jr.; Susan Jones; Tandy Jones Gilliland v. City of Lakeland, Tennessee, 12 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 235, 237-38 (2001) (describing how circuit courts are split on diligent
prosecution bar).
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view of the provision only barring citizen suits in limited circum-
stances.52  The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in contrast, bars far
more citizen suits due to a more expansive definition of what gov-
ernment action satisfies the Act’s language.53  The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently moved towards the growing trend to nar-
row the ability of citizens to sue under the Clean Water Act.54  Re-
ferring to the Supreme Court’s rulings on the role of citizen suits,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the narrow role of citizen suits and the
limited provisions covered.55  The court justified its expansive read-
ing of the bar and again noted citizen suits are secondary to govern-
ment action.56
B. Clean Air Act
The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, also known as
the Clean Air Act, was initially enacted in 1955 as general awareness
of air pollution began to grow.57  Not unlike the Clean Water Act,
the law was designed to regulate pollution and air quality through-
out the nation.58  The law is comprehensive, providing detailed
standards for air quality, federal enforcement of the law, penalties
for noncompliance, and emission standards.59  Additionally, the law
contains provisions protecting the ozone layer and, perhaps surpris-
ingly, limitations for noise pollution and acid deposition control.60
Contained within the general provisions part of the statute is
the private right of action.61  Like the Clean Air Act, this provision
provides a basis for private parties to file suits for violations of the
52. See id. at 245-46 (explaining Ninth Circuit’s rulings on meaning of diligent
prosecution bar).
53. See id. at 243 (describing First Circuit’s view of bar and implications of
interpretation).
54. See Askins v. Ohio Dep’t of Agriculture, 809 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2016)
(ruling suit is precluded under Clean Water Act).
55. See id. at 875 (explaining Congress would have allowed more suits if it
intended to).
56. Id. (arguing expansive reading asked for by Askins would give citizens
more enforcement power than EPA).
57. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012) (passing law into effect at specified
date).
58. See id. (stating general purpose of legislation).
59. See generally §§ 7401-7590 (describing various subsections of law and what
they entail).
60. See generally §§ 7641-7671 (setting out standards for curbing of various
types of pollution).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (describing what provisions entail and various require-
ments underneath standard).
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Act.62  The Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provision served as a base for
the Clean Water Act’s provision.63  The Clean Air Act was the first
environmental statute to grant a private right of action.64  Logically,
the diligent prosecution bar in the Clean Air Act is worded almost
exactly the same as the Clean Water Act.65  The key difference be-
tween the two is the Clean Air Act’s bar does not prohibit a claim if
the government is pursuing a criminal action, only a civil one.66
Along with the similar statutory language, federal courts have
interpreted the language of the statute similarly.67  Like the bar in
the Clean Water Act, the bar here is not a jurisdictional limitation,
and, as such, claims cannot be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction
under the bar, only for failure to state a claim.68  Generally, the
standards for what government action constitutes a “diligent prose-
cution” are also similar under the Clean Water Act.69
Courts have more precisely defined the types of government
action constituting a bar under this Act.70  For example, in a recent
decision tilting against private suits, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated the mere presence of litigation in court will prohibit a
citizen suit “as well as after the litigation has been terminated by a
final judgment, consent decree, or consent order and agree-
ment.”71  Any attempt to enforce the same regulatory standard the
EPA has already brought action for will trigger the diligent prosecu-
62. § 7604(a)(1) (creating private cause of action for violation of standards
under act).
63. See Kurtas, supra note 51, at 235 n.3 (2001) (describing basis of citizen suit
provision for CWA).
64. See Appel, supra note 24, at 94 (noting historical relevance of citizen suit
provision).
65. Compare § 7604(b)(1)(B) with 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (limiting when
citizen suits may occur and when they may not).
66. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (carving out narrow exception for citizen suits to occur
in).  The statute reads, in key part, “[n]o action may be commenced . . . if the
Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action
in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with the standard,
limitation, or order . . . .” Id.
67. See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text (reviewing similar statutory
history and interpretation as Clean Water Act).
68. See Group Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116,
126 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding Congress did not mandate bar jurisdictional and thus
should not be found jurisdictional).
69. See supra notes 51-56 (describing standards of diligent prosecution bar of
Clean Water Act).
70. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (drawing sharper lines on
types of actions covered by bar).
71. Shenango, 810 F.3d at 132 (ruling on standards of when citizen suits are
precluded by diligent prosecution bar).
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tion bar.72  Courts conclude the bar in this Act serves the same pur-
pose as the Clean Water Act bar: to prevent redundant litigation.73
The court’s logic is that only one method of enforcement is neces-
sary.74  It is crucial to look at whether the government action en-
compasses all the claims the private party brought.75
Despite narrow limitations imposed by the bar, actions brought
to enforce a different regulatory standard than the one the govern-
ment is enforcing are allowed.76  The action would not be redun-
dant, as it would be pursuing relief for a different violation.77
Pending state administrative actions do not constitute a bar either,
as they are not actions within a court of law.78  Despite these al-
lowances, the bar still restricts private action even where the govern-
ment does not achieve the outcome desired by the private citizen.79
Moreover, even if the regulated party is still violating the terms of
an EPA consent decree, the private citizen is still barred from su-
ing.80  The court stated the only necessary analysis to determine if
an action is diligently prosecuted is if the government enforcement
is capable of bringing the violator into compliance with the act.81
C. Solid Waste Disposal Act
The Solid Waste Disposal Act, otherwise known as the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), was originally
passed in 1965 amid growing concerns for environmental cleanli-
72. See Maryland Waste Coal. v. SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474, 1483 (D. Md.
1985) (finding it would defeat purpose of citizen suit provision to prevent suit for
all related provisions).
73. See id. (arguing where EPA has already found violation and enforced
against it, citizen suits are not necessary)
74. See id. (concluding EPA action is only action needed).
75. See Moran v. Vaccaro, 684 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing
case due to EPA action encompassing all parts of plaintiff’s claim).
76. See id. (noting dismissal would not have been proper had EPA’s complaint
not addressed all continuing incidents related to citizens’ allegations of Clean Air
Act violations).
77. See Maryland Waste Coal., 616 F. Supp. at 1483 (blocking action only be-
cause EPA is already enforcing for same violation).
78. See id. at 1481 (assessing precedent to determine administrative actions of
Maryland Department do not constitute bar).
79. See Citizens for Clean Power v. Indian River Power, LLC, 636 F. Supp. 2d
351, 357 (D. Del. 2009) (finding citizens’ preference for more stringent standard
irrelevant in decision making).
80. See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., LLC, 500
F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (E.D. La. 2007) (stating monthly violations of agreement are
acceptable due to agreement being in place).
81. See id. at 606-07 (detailing EPA decree’s demands and evidence violator is
already beginning to follow decree).
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ness.82  In addition to the statute’s general provisions, it creates an
Office of Solid Waste and lays out the authorities of the Administra-
tor.83  The statute also describes plans for states to follow and other
federal duties and responsibilities under the Act.84  Plans for re-
search and development are set out as well as separate provisions
for regulation of underground storage tanks and medical waste dis-
posal.85  Of most relevance to this Comment, the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act also contains a citizen suit provision.86
The citizen suit provision in the Solid Waste Disposal Act uses
nearly identical language to the previous two statutes, though the
courts’ statutory construction has subtle differences.87  The lan-
guage of the diligent prosecution bar is identical to the provision in
the Clean Water Act, barring suit when the government is pursuing
either a civil or criminal action.88  Courts have interpreted the pro-
visions of both statutes in a similar manner as well, determining, for
instance, that the diligent prosecution bar is not a jurisdictional re-
quirement.89  Administrative proceedings also do not constitute
“actions” under the statute, as they do not occur in federal court.90
As part of RCRA, litigants have challenged the diligent prose-
cution bar due to its relation with the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).91
CERCLA is another federal law providing for citizen suits relating
to improper disposal of waste.92  Despite the similarity of the claims,
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2012) (noting when statute was passed and series of
amendments to it).
83. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911-6916 (describing authorities of Administrator, du-
ties, labeling requirements, and various other provisions).
84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6966 (describing application of state and local law to
statute, position of EPA, and administrative responsibilities).
85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6992 (laying out requirements of waste disposal
under these portions of act).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (creating private right of action).
87. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) with 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) and 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (limiting when citizen suits may occur and when they may
not).
88. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) with 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (bar-
ring claims in exact same manner).
89. See Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 492 (7th Cir. 2011) (hold-
ing Congress could have made claims expressly jurisdictional if desired).
90. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Rodriguez-Perez, 455 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006)
(finding administrative proceeding of Puerto Rico as not raising bar).
91. See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575-76 (10th Cir. 1993)
(analyzing relationship between CERCLA and RCRA).
92. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (detailing comprehensive liability for
environmental claims and providing standards for enforcement).
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a district court found the bar does not prevent a claim under the
RCRA when an action is already in court under CERCLA.93
The courts have also been lenient towards plaintiffs in allowing
similar claims under the RCRA.94  Small differences in remedial ac-
tions and contaminants were enough to lead the First Circuit Court
of Appeals to rule the bar did not apply to such suits.95  Further, a
district court held that even when administrative actions are ongo-
ing at state-level, citizen suits are not barred.96  The exact action
must be covered by the exact provision of the statute in order for a
claim to be barred.97
Even when the EPA has ordered a defendant to perform reme-
dial actions, at least one court has declined to bar a subsequent
citizen suit that sought relief for violations occurring at different
locations and involving different contaminants.98  Still, courts seem
to want to expand the boundaries of the bar.99  Further, courts simi-
larly held claims that government action “[in]effectively remedied”
damages caused by defendants were not enough to overcome the
the bar.100  Even where the docket of a state court is proceeding
slowly, the bar will block citizen suits when some type of settlement
discussion is ongoing.101  Existing EPA administrative orders al-
ready carried out will bar claims, despite the general holding that
administrative action from the EPA will not stop a claim.102
93. See Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1580 (finding CERCLA actions do not encompass
remedial methods under RCRA).
94. See Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol Puerto Rico Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 34 (1st
Cir. 2011) (defining bar as discrete statutorily enumerated list of actions).
95. See Sanchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) (ruling
different remedial obligations arise from different types of contaminants).
96. See Orange Env’t, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1025-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding state administrative action is not action to which bar
applies).
97. See Sanchez, 572 F.3d at 13 (specifying narrow manner of barred suits).
98. See Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (M.D. Pa.
1985) (stating action is not barred as it adds to EPA action in lieu of replicating it).
99. See Board Of Cty. Comm’rs of La Plata v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 598 F.
Supp. 2d 1185, 1200 (D. Colo. 2009) (criticizing plaintiff’s citation of Acme Print-
ing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1398 (E.D. Wis. 1992)).
100. See McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401, 1407-08
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (preventing claim where EPA has taken action of some type).
101. Hudson Riverkeeper Fund v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp.
251, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reasoning Congress was aware state dockets were slow
and made no exception for application of diligent prosecution bar).
102. See LeClercq v. Lockformer Co., No. 00C 7164, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8092, at *14 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding administrative order entered and claim
blocked due to it).
10
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II. POLISHING COAL FOR DIAMOND: ANALYZING THE
DILIGENT PROSECUTION BAR
Supporters of the diligent prosecution bar justify its use with
the underlying view that the government is best suited to tackle en-
vironmental protection and that regulation should be the primary
avenue of controlling environmental problems.103  Courts consider
private citizen suits secondary and believe they should only be used
to enforce a claim if the government has failed to do so.104  An-
other justification that legal scholars assert is that citizen suits serve
as a form of free riding: the government investigates and then a
private citizen tacks a suit on to reap monetary benefits without do-
ing the legwork.105
Despite these assertions, the government is regularly to blame
for causing pollution.106  The Gold King Mine case is only one re-
cent example where the EPA is directly responsible for causing de-
struction to the environment.107  Additionally, even where the
government is enforcing an action against a separate violator, a citi-
zen is often left without recompense for the harm they exper-
ienced.108  The EPA will enforce a fine or an injunctive order
against the entity, and then the entity will continue to violate the
law, leaving the private citizen without a course of action to be
made whole.109  The goal of environmental protection and protect-
ing citizens from harm is not served by preventing suits for these
harms.110  To support the argument for reexamination of the dili-
103. See supra notes 32-102 and accompanying text (describing analytical
background to evaluate diligent prosecution bar precedent).
104. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987) (arguing
position citizen suits are supposed to support government action).
105. See Appel, supra note 24, at 91 (describing argument in support of strin-
gent prosecution bar).
106. See generally Corinne Roels et al., Military bases’ contamination will affect
water for generations, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.pub-
licintegrity.org/2017/08/18/21105/military-bases-contamination-will-affect-water-
generations (describing massive contamination of soil and groundwater at 149 cur-
rent and former domestic military installations).
107. See Shankar Vedantam, New EPA Mercury Rule Omits Conflicting Data,
WASH. POST Mar. 22, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A55268-2005Mar21.html (describing EPA suppressing study on
mercury emissions conflicting with their results).
108. See McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401, 1407-08
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (ruling against plaintiff despite claims of continual harm).
109. See Hudson Riverkeeper Fund v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 919 F. Supp.
251, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (preventing suit despite admitting continual violation of
injunctive order).
110. Contra id. (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss citizen suit).  Rather,
the court took note of the policy concerns that the duty of enforcing compliance
with a permit or regulation lies exclusively within the purview of the state. Id.
11
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gent prosecution bar, this section of the Comment will first ex-
amine instances of the government causing pollution.111  The
second section will examine other instances in which the govern-
ment is not the source of pollution, but enforces the diligent prose-
cution bar prohibiting private claims.112
A. Government Pollution
The United States federal government, state, and local govern-
ments all contribute to pollution and environmental damage.113
The Flint Water Crisis is a recent, notable example of a municipality
causing environmental harm.114  More accurately, it was a combina-
tion of both Flint’s city government and the Michigan state govern-
ment.115  To save the government money, officials decided to
source water from the Flint River, causing the city water supply to
fill with lead and poisoning thousands of residents.116  Luckily for
these residents, they were able to file suit against the governments
and officials involved in the incident and reached a settlement ben-
efitting those harmed from the incident.117  Potential future claim-
ants might not be so lucky if they attempt to seek recovery for their
harm as the EPA and Congress continue to enact many policies
shielding municipalities from liability and prevent citizens from re-
covering for harm caused by the municipalities.118  Though the law
of sovereign immunity is distinct from the diligent prosecution bar,
the bar’s justification fails when the primary enforcer of environ-
mental action is perpetrating environmental harm.119
“[That] a private plaintiff would [maintain] control of the litigation” would be “a
result not acceptable to Congress.” Id. at 257.
111. See infra notes 113-150 and accompanying text (analyzing government-
caused pollution and impact).
112. See infra notes 151-211 and accompanying text (examining applications
of diligent prosecution bar detrimental to citizens).
113. See infra notes 114-150 and accompanying text (showcasing examples of
government polluting environment).
114. See generally Flint Water Crisis Fast Facts, CNN (Nov. 28, 2017), https://
www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/us/flint-water-crisis-fast-facts/index.html (detailing
timeline of crisis in Flint, Michigan).
115. Id. (describing role of both governments in crisis).
116. See id. (explaining cost saving measures resulting in sourcing water from
Flint River and contaminating water supply).
117. See Chris Boyette, Michigan and Flint Agree To Replace 18,000 Home Water
Lines By 2020, CNN (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/27/us/flint-
settlement/ (laying out details of settlement to fix pipe lines).
118. Appel, supra note 24, at 99 (describing ways government protects pol-
luters from liability in private citizen actions).
119. See generally Russell Madden, Government Versus The Environment, FOUND.
FOR ECON. EDUC. (Feb. 1, 1998), https://fee.org/articles/government-versus-the-
12
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One might argue this issue is unique to local and state govern-
ment; however, the federal government continues to allow pollu-
tion by lower government entities to go unpunished in many
circumstances.120  The City of Atlanta, for instance, violated the
Clean Water Act repeatedly until pollution reached levels the fed-
eral government could no longer ignore.121  An examination of
twenty-two miles of Atlanta’s sewer system in 1998 uncovered a mas-
sive array of problems.122  Most of the manholes either had “broken
rims or missing covers.”123  All of the sewer pipelines were poorly
maintained, leaking refuse and overgrown by plant life.124  Atlanta’s
creeks were “laden with trash and polluted with high levels of fecal
coliform bacteria, indicators of possible disease-causing viruses and
bacteria.”125  Though the EPA was responsible for conducting the
investigation and prompting the Justice Department to take action
against Atlanta, this occurred only after repeatedly allowing Atlanta
to break deadlines for fixing the issues with the system over an un-
known period of time.126  The sewer system became a near disaster
before the federal government finally stepped in and took ac-
tion.127  After the government did take action, the diligent prosecu-
tion bar would have stopped any claim a citizen of Atlanta might
have had against their city government.128
Outside of these individual incidents, state and local govern-
ments are, overall, some of the biggest sources of pollution in the
environment/ (arguing government does more harm to environment than good
by regulation).
120. See infra notes 121-131 and accompanying text (describing federal com-
placency in pollution by state and local governments).
121. Appel, supra note 118, at 99 (detailing government negligence in enforc-
ing action against City of Atlanta).
122. Charles Seabrook, Sewer Probe Cites a Sprawling Mess Legal Action Looms:
While Atlanta Officials Say Major Repairs Are Under Way, A Federal-State Investigation
Calls the Efforts ‘Inadequate’ and ‘Too Slow’, ATLANTA CONST. October 16, 1997, at C,
available at http://ezproxy.villanova.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/
docview/413789023?accountid=14853 (describing issues with Atlanta sewer
system).
123. Id. (continuing to detail exact extent of Atlanta sewer system
negligence).
124. See id. (explaining causes of sloppy sewer system).
125. Id. (revealing extent of environmental harm to creeks of Atlanta).
126. See id. (stating city missed unknown number of deadlines in course of
environmental investigation).
127. Seabrook, supra note 122 (outlining overall extent of environmental
damage to Atlanta’s sewer system).
128. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (preventing claims when government is
pursuing action against offender).
13
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United States.129  Returning to Georgia as an example, public enti-
ties are the greatest source of pollution in the state, racking up over
fourteen million dollars in fines between 1998 and 2011.130  The
taxpayer must cover the costs of fines levied on their local govern-
ments, even while being barred from making claims due to the fact
the EPA’s aforementioned fines raise the diligent prosecution bar
and prevent a private suit.131
While many city and state governments cause pollution, they
pale in comparison to the world’s greatest polluter: the United
States federal government.132  With the use of 500,000 buildings
and 600,000 vehicles, the federal government is the country’s larg-
est consumer of energy.133  The federal government’s carbon foot-
print stands at 123.2 million metric tons of carbon dioxide per
year.134  Despite efforts from numerous administrations to lower
pollution, the federal government continues to cause environmen-
tal havoc.135  The largest polluter is the United States Department
of Defense (DOD), which pollutes “more than the rest of the fed-
eral government combined.”136  In fact, the Department of Defense
produces more hazardous waste than the five largest U.S. chemical
companies combined.137  Ignoring areas in other countries the
DOD has contaminated, there are still 39,000 contaminated areas
129. W.E. Messamore, The Number One Worst Polluter on Earth Is . . . The U.S.
Federal Government, INDEP. VOTER NETWORK (Apr. 18, 2012), https://ivn.us/2012/
04/18/the-number-one-worst-polluter-on-earth-is-the-u-s-federal-government/
(describing largest sources of pollution in United States).
130. See Aaron Diamant, Counties and State Among Georgia’s Biggest Polluters,
WSB-TV (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/counties-and-state-
among-georgias-biggest-polluter/241631107 (detailing investigation into state’s
biggest environmental offenders).
131. See id. (noting harm to taxpayers due to government environmental
pollution).
132. See Whitney Webb, U.S. Military Is World’s Biggest Polluter, ECOWATCH
(May 15, 2017), https://www.ecowatch.com/military-largest-polluter-2408760609
.html (describing extent of U.S. military pollution).
133. Lisa Rein, Government Agencies Make Plans To Reduce Federal Carbon Foot-
print In Next Decade, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/09/AR2010090906850.html (detailing re-
sources causing pollution under federal government).
134. Messamore, supra note 129 (explaining federal government’s environ-
mental impact).
135. See Rein, supra note 133 (describing ongoing but failing efforts to reduce
pollution).
136. Messamore, supra note 129 (laying out extent of Department of Defense
pollution).
137. Webb, supra note 132 (comparing extent of government pollution with
often demonized private pollution).  The DOD has polluted locations throughout
the world with chemicals including “depleted uranium, oil, jet fuel, pesticides, de-
foliants like Agent Orange and lead, among others.” Id.
14
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compromising nineteen million acres the DOD has caused environ-
mental harm to.138  The environmental havoc is extensive; the DOD
has flooded areas with chemicals, ruining the soil and drinking
water.139
The casualties have been horrendous for foreign entities host-
ing DOD forces as well.140  Iraq’s agricultural industry was de-
stroyed by U.S. military intervention and the Iraqi people are now
“forced to import more than 80  percent of [their] food” from
abroad.141  The Marshall Islands, a frequent site of nuclear weapon
testing in the 1940s and 50s, is still contaminated by radiation and,
unsurprisingly, residents of the nation and nearby Guam continue
to suffer from high rates of cancer.142
Less surprisingly, the U.S. government has been reluctant to
allow claims for environmental harm.143  Despite confirming the
Marine Corps contaminated water at a base in North Carolina in
the 80s, the government only began to process claims in the early
part of 2017 after decades of litigation.144  The environmental harm
138. Alexander Nazaryan, The US Department of Defense Is One of The World’s
Biggest Polluters, NEWSWEEK (July 17, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/07/
25/us-department-defence-one-worlds-biggest-polluters-259456.html (describing
land area polluted by federal government).
139. See Webb, supra note 132 (explaining harm to soil and ground under-
neath DOD buildings and installations).
140. See id. (surveying harm suffered by foreign entities due to DOD
pollution).
141. Id. (describing destruction of Iraqi soil and results therein).
142. See Div. of Cancer Epidemiology & Genetics, NCI Dose Estimation and Pre-
dicted Cancer Risk For Residents of The Marshall Islands Exposed To Radioactive Fallout
From U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing at Bikini and Enewetak, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://dceg.cancer.gov/research/how-we-study/exposure-assessment/nci-dose-
estimation-predicted-cancer-risk-residents-marshall-islands (last visited Nov. 3,
2018) (describing extent of cancer in population of Marshall Islands).  The NCI
investigators concluded “as much as 1.6% of all cancers among those residents of
the Marshall Islands alive between 1948 and 1970 might be attributable to expo-
sure from U.S. nuclear testing fallout.” Id.
143. See Richard Sisk, VA To Begin Processing Camp Lejeune Toxic Water Claims,
MILITARY.COM, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/02/25/va-to-begin-
processing-camp-lejeune-toxic-water-claims.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) (detail-
ing decades of litigation preceding Veteran Administration’s (VA) acceptance of
disability claims from those affected).
144. Id. (stating VA would accept claims for eight presumptive conditions be-
ginning in March 2018).  The EPA listed Camp Lejeune, a base in North Carolina,
as a toxic Superfund site in 1989 after three potential decades of water pollution.
Id.  The VA battled claims from soldiers for decades before finally promulgating a
rule in the Federal Register allowing those who served at the base during the pe-
riod in which pollution occurred to file claims. Id.  The VA claims the rule is his-
toric as it is one of the few instances of stateside soldiers being allowed to make
disability claims. Id.
15
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caused by the DOD continues to receive little scrutiny.145  In May
2017, the Associated Press met news that a Naval station in Virginia
Beach spilled more than 94,000 gallons of jet fuel into a waterway
located less than a mile away from the Atlantic Ocean with an eight-
sentence article.146  Even some of the harshest critics of U.S. mili-
tary overreach, such as Senator Bernie Sanders, note nothing about
the environmental harm the DOD has caused and continues to
cause.147
Despite the ideals of the government serving to prevent envi-
ronmental harm, citizens are left with a different reality the diligent
prosecution bar does not acknowledge.148  For all of the Supreme
Court’s claims the citizen suit is secondary to the government en-
forcement of environmental protection, the government’s track re-
cord on pollution leaves that policy questionable.149  Courts should
give citizen suits more leeway to move forward given the govern-
ment’s history of environmental destruction.150
B. Inadequacy of Government Prosecution
Even where the EPA or state government brings an action, the
private citizen may not be best served by this action.151  Govern-
ment regulation does not directly compensate the harmed party
145. See generally Webb, supra note 132 (noting lack of response to DOD pollu-
tion around world); W.E. Messamore, supra note 129 (stating little notice or pro-
test from media regarding federal government pollution).
146. Navy: Significant Amount of Jet Fuel Leaked at Base, AP (May 11, 2017),
https://apnews.com/ad3921277f4b4f1bb4fc098df3d43748/Navy:-%22Significant-
amount%22-of-jet-fuel-leaked-at-base (touching briefly on news of Navy jet fuel
spill).
147. See generally Niv Elis, Sanders Blasts GOP Push To Increase Military Spending,
THE HILL (Sept. 21, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/351765-sanders-
blasts-gop-push-to-increase-military-spending (lambasting Republicans for military
spending increases while failing to include environmental harm among criticisms).
Bernie Sanders is a U.S. Senator from Vermont who has protested military inter-
vention in the Middle East repeatedly, though noting nothing about the environ-
mental impact of this intervention.  Bernie Sanders, International Relations, BERNIE
SANDERS: U.S. SENATOR FOR VERMONT, https://www.sanders.senate.gov/legisla
tion/issue/international-relations (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
148. See supra notes 113-147 and accompanying text (elaborating upon pollu-
tion by federal, state, and local governments).
149. See Russell Madden, Government Versus The Environment, FOUND. FOR
ECON. EDUC. (Feb. 1, 1998), https://fee.org/articles/government-versus-the-envi
ronment/ (showcasing government policies harming environment and rights of
citizenry in pursuing environmental protection).
150. See id. (questioning basis for government to regulate environment given
harm it causes).
151. See infra notes 152-211 and accompanying text (detailing unsatisfactory
results for citizens from government environmental regulation).
16
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who bears the brunt of the environmental harm.152  While it may
lead to the regulated entity eventually ceasing the harm, this does
not provide a remedy for all the past wrongs already endured by the
citizens.153  The regulated entity might still persist in violating the
EPA order, resulting in continued harm to the citizen.154  Despite
the continued violation, courts will find citizen suits excessive, as an
order is already in place or action already pursued in court.155  The
citizen may find little comfort in this logic where their waterways
continue to be polluted.156
The Supreme Court concluded that allowing citizen suits in
certain circumstances would curtail the discretionary ability of the
federal government.157  A hypothetical posed by the Court sug-
gested that allowing a citizen to pursue a lawsuit after the EPA al-
ready cut a deal with the violator would limit the government’s
available courses of action in pursuing a violator, since the violator
would have less incentive to work with the government if they could
be sued even after making a deal.158  Given the secondary nature
citizen suits are supposed to serve, the Court determined this would
be an unacceptable result.159
Some legal scholars also argue in support of the secondary role
of citizen suits, as they believe the government has superior re-
sources and the proper expertise to know when to negotiate with a
violator or pursue a more aggressive action.160  An additional argu-
ment is a defendant is more likely to negotiate with the government
152. See Appel, supra note 24, at 101 (noting government action enforces
fines, which are collected for government use).
153. See id. at 102 (implying citizens would get little out of increased govern-
ment enforcement).
154. See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., LLC,
500 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (E.D. La. 2007) (forbidding private claim despite
monthly violations of EPA order).
155. Id. (arguing EPA order was already in place and private action would be
redundant).
156. See Susan Buchanan, U.S. Eyes European Safety Standards for Oil Refineries,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buch
anan/us-eyes-european-safety-s_b_5150307.html (noting Chalmette Refining had
seventy spills and releases from 2012-2014).
157. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987)
(arguing bar prevents citizen suits from being intrusive and taking away decision-
making from federal and state governments).
158. See id. at 61 (describing hypothetical enforcement where citizen would
disrupt Administrator plan if allowed to sue).
159. See id. (stating Congress did not intend result of citizen suits becoming
potentially intrusive).
160. Appel, supra note 24, at 101 (arguing diligent prosecution bar makes
sense when government action is already occurring).
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if it knows future suits will be barred.161  Further, if the only result is
a larger fine against the violator, the additional benefit to the envi-
ronment may be minimal.162  Political support for environmental
cases may also be weakened if they are seen as only existing to gen-
erate attorney’s fees.163
The EPA does spend more time pursuing environmental ends
than the average citizen and has access to greater wealth.164  A de-
fendant is probably more likely to work with the government if fu-
ture suits can be prevented.165  But this ignores the proposition that
many private firms specialize in environmental law and have dedi-
cated their entire practice to it.166  The argument that allowing citi-
zen suits to proceed might disrupt government negotiations rests
on the logic that government negotiation is inherently superior,
creating a circular reasoning fallacy.167
This Comment has previously demonstrated examples of the
government’s shortcomings in handling environmental issues.168
Another example exists in Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee
Metro. Sewerage District.169  There, the municipal entity in charge of
managing sewage repeatedly violated a discharge permit and re-
leased hundreds of gallons of raw sewage into the rivers of the
city.170  The local government and Wisconsin state government en-
161. Id. (describing logic in support of argument that action would prevent
settlements).  The author argues that a violator open to potential suit wouldn’t
negotiate and instead try to save its wealth for future litigation instead of spending
it on cleanup efforts. Id.
162. See id. at 101-02 (suggesting result of higher administrative fine could
benefit other sources of government spending like military).
163. Id. at 102 (describing potential view of citizen suits as low-hanging fruit).
164. See FY 2019 Budget, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last visited Feb. 28, 2018)
https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/fy2019 (noting potential fiscal year 2019
budget of six billion for EPA).
165. See Appel, supra note 160, at 101 (presenting logic in support of future
suits deterring settlement between government and violator).
166. See generally Practices, MANKO, GOLD, KATCHER, & FOX, https://www.man
kogold.com/practices.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (describing extensive envi-
ronmental practice of firm).
167. See Craig Rusbult, Definitions of Circular Reasoning (Begging The Question),
AM. SCI. AFFILIATION, http://www.asa3.org/ASA/education/think/circular.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (defining circular reasoning as stating conclusion as
proof of conclusion).
168. See supra notes 113-150 and accompanying text (detailing instances of
government causing environmental harm).
169. 382 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2004) (deciding case between local govern-
ment and citizen environmental group).
170. See id. at 748-49 (describing history of government agency dumping sew-
age into Lake Michigan and rivers around Milwaukee).
18
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tered into an agreement to solve the problem.171  Thirty years later,
the problem remained unresolved, prompting the suit.172  This is-
sue prompted another agreement between state and local govern-
ment, which became the basis for the district court to terminate the
citizen action.173  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was skepti-
cal that the action truly was a diligent prosecution after looking at
the evidence, and remanded the case back to the district court.174
The case would ultimately be dismissed.175
The environmental damage caused by state governments goes
beyond simple isolated cases.176  Legal scholars find support for the
notion that state governments systemically use litigation to shield
polluters from private claims.177  One national environmental advo-
cacy group disbanded its entire litigation program due to this
trend, finding it impossible to maintain the practice due to the lack
of success in pursuing claims.178  Additionally, the EPA created poli-
cies shielding municipalities from liability under CERCLA.179  One
example can be found in United States v. Dart Industries.180  In Dart
Industries, the defendant corporations were being sued by the U.S.
government for generating hazardous waste material on a site in
Fort Lawn, South Carolina.181  Dart Industries raised a third-party
defendant defense claiming the South Carolina Department of
171. See id. at 749 (explaining stipulation entered into by state of Wisconsin
and local government agency). This stipulation would admit to more than sixty
violations of their permit without requiring them to pay any penalties or fines. Id.
172. See id. at 750 (noting plaintiff’s observations and subsequent basis for
suit).
173. See id. at 751 (describing new stipulation entered into during plaintiff’s
suit and district court’s subsequent action).
174. See Friends of Milawaukee’s Rivers, 382 F.3d at 765 (ruling findings were
unclear and remanding for further determination of issue).
175. See Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist.,
No. 02-C-0270, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91909, at *31 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 14, 2007) (find-
ing further evidence did not allow suit to continue forward).
176. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Fed-
eral System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1648 (1995) (describing
habitual practice of states litigating to shield polluters from liability).
177. See id. (describing trend of state starting litigation only after citizen suits
have begun).
178. Id. at 1648-51 (describing repeated preemption of suits brought by Na-
tional Resources Defense Council and subsequent dissolution of its litigation
department).
179. Appel, supra note 24, at 99 (describing efforts by EPA and United States
Congress to shield municipal governments from costs of cleaning environmental
damage by statute).
180. See generally United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988)
(dismissing claims of defendant and holding liable).
181. See id. at 145 (explaining factual background of case).
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Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) allowed previous own-
ers of the site to store hazardous waste and issued permits for it.182
Under Dart’s theory, the DHEC would have  counted as an owner
and operator who controlled activities on the site.183  The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found DHEC “approved or disapproved
applications to store wastes at Fort Lawn, inspected the site,” and
went as far as to ensure wastes were properly transported to the
site.184  Despite these findings, the court held the DHEC’s actions
did not constitute ownership under the statute and the DHEC
could not be held liable.185  The court even conceded the DHEC
likely was negligent in enforcing the state environmental
regulations.186
Government failures are not the only ones shielded from
claims, as agricultural interests are also protected from liability for
environmental damage.187  As noted by one legal scholar, “nearly
every major federal environmental statute exempts production agri-
culture.”188  Farms are commonly among the most prolific agents of
environmental degradation.189  The natural habitats around farms
are thrown out of balance due to the combination of chemicals pro-
duced by farming and the alterations to the natural nutrients in the
area.190  The leading cause of soil erosion in the United States is
farming, as nearly a third of all farmland is considered highly erod-
ible.191  Furthermore, the animal wastes from farms combined with
the agrochemical releases farms produce are all major pollutants
and sources of environmental harm.192  Farming also remains one
182. Id. (raising defense by asserting liability on part of another party).  CER-
CLA provides a third party defense, allowing the defendant to escape liability, pro-
vided they prove a third party caused release of the hazardous substance.  42
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2012).
183. See Dart Indus., 847 F.2d at 146 (arguing DHEC should be held liable as
owner and operator of site).
184. Id. (detailing involvement of DHEC at site in question).
185. Id. (ruling DHEC cannot be found liable under third party defense).
186. Id. (noting DHEC’s management of site likely was inadequate).
187. See Appel, supra note 24, at 99 (asserting law is protective of agricultural
interests potentially explaining lack of suits against such interests for CWA
violations).
188. See John Davidson, Conservation Agriculture: An Old New Idea, 9 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV’T 20, 20 (1995) (discussing statutory protection of agriculture).
189. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274-92 (2000) (surveying various environmental harms caused
by farming).
190. See id. at 277 (describing loss of habitat caused by farming and disruption
to ecosystems).
191. Id. (detailing loss of soil organic matter leading to erosion).
192. See generally id. at 282-287 (describing variety of environmental harms
caused by farming).
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of the major sources of greenhouse gases as the combination of
fertilizer and chemicals from animal waste contribute to lesser air
quality.193
Despite these clear instances of agricultural pollution, citizens
attempting to sue farms for water pollution under the Clean Water
Act (CWA) run into the roadblock of government interpreting the
law to defeat these suits.194  This is more than a matter of courts
occasionally interpreting law in an unfavorable manner, as the EPA
deliberately acted to shield farms from liability.195  Within the CWA
is a provision establishing a permitting program called the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which is aimed
at limiting private pollution discharges.196  The NPDES only allows
permits when the pollutants remain under a certain level, which
most farming discharges would not qualify under.197  The EPA
promulgated an administrative exception rather than attempting to
issue permits to the nation’s two million farms.198  Though the
courts struck this down as clearly against the intent of the CWA,
Congress overrode the courts and codified the exemption.199
Citizens seeking to bring action outside of statutory environ-
mental law will also find it difficult to bring common law claims.200
All states have laws shielding farms from common law nuisance
suits.201  Some may argue farms deserve a shield from liability con-
sidering their economic and social benefits and deep roots in
American culture.202  Yet many citizens harmed by agriculture are
193. See id. at 291-92 (detailing types of air pollution emissions resulting from
farming).
194. See Appel, supra note 24, at 100 (describing pollution from farms being
protected from liability). Farm pollution largely results in runoff, which, as non-
point source pollution, makes it difficult to prove liability under the current legal
framework. Id.
195. See Ruhl, supra note 189, at 294 (detailing EPA efforts to protect farms
from permitting system).
196. Id. (describing statutory creation of permit system and how it functions).
197. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2012) (creating permitting system and
requirements therein).
198. Ruhl, supra note 189, at 294 (describing EPA effort to circumvent issuing
permits to farms).
199. Id. (detailing history of legislative solidification of agricultural immu-
nity); see also Fed. Reg. 18,000, 18,003 (1973) (excepting agriculture from needing
NPDES permit).
200. See id. at 315 (describing farms’ safe harbor from common law claim of
nuisance).
201. Id. at 315-16 (demonstrating extent of shield farms have from common
law liability).
202. Id. at 265 (suggesting reasons farms receive extensive shield from liability
and escape scrutiny).
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left without a means to make a claim.203  The history of government
enabling environmental harm, if not being the direct cause of it,
questions the premise that government is the entity best suited to
police environmental matters.204
The federal government does not completely turn a blind eye
to the inefficiency of state government.205  Occasionally, the federal
government will support citizens when they claim a state govern-
ment is not properly prosecuting a claim.206  Yet this has created
federalism issues where federal judges have to judge state level ex-
ecutive action for diligence.207  Judges express discomfort with hav-
ing to decide what level of state action meets the requirements of
the bar.208  The first draft of the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Air Act contained no diligent prosecution bar, making it likely legis-
lators were potentially aware of these issues.209  Supporters of the
bar may cite federal intervention into state affairs as a positive de-
velopment and as proof government is best suited to handle envi-
ronmental issues.210  Given the federalism issues and the national
government’s own mistakes, the grounding for the bar is
questionable.211
III. CLEARING OUT THE RUBBLE: THE FUTURE OF THE
DILIGENT PROSECUTION BAR
The EPA’s mishap at the Gold King Mine is far from an iso-
lated incident.212  This environmental disaster is another incident
203. See supra notes 32-102 and accompanying text (detailing extensive bars of
environmental acts and private actions blocked by them).
204. See supra notes 169-203 and accompanying text (detailing past instances
in which government acquiesced or failed to address environmental damages).
205. See Appel, supra note 24, at 102 (describing federal government’s reserva-
tion of right to over file case).
206. Id. at 103 (explaining instances where federal government has supported
citizen suits against state agencies for lack of diligent prosecution).
207. See id. (describing federalism issues federal judges are faced with in de-
ciding cases).
208. Id. (suggesting judges may even feel incompetent to properly decide
these issues).
209. See id. (noting lack of federalism issues in original draft of amendments
to Clean Air Act).
210. See generally Meredith Medoway, Why The Federal Government, Not States,
Should Regulate The Environment, MIC (Feb. 11, 2012), https://mic.com/articles/
4090/why-the-federal-government-not-states-should-regulate-the-environment#.mk
7Z2M4hp (arguing federal legislation protects environment best).
211. See supra notes 113-210 and accompanying text (detailing government
mistakes in regulation and judge’s struggles with federalism issues).
212. See supra notes 1-211 and accompanying text (surveying diligent prosecu-
tion bar in light of Gold King Mine disaster).
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in a history of governmental negligence, if not willful ignorance.213
Congress designed the diligent prosecution bar in environmental
statutes to ensure private citizen action remained secondary to the
actions of government.214  Reality tells a different story than ideals
when, in practice, government itself pollutes or shields polluters
from the claims of citizens harmed by their environmental
damage.215
Whether the diligent prosecution bar should continue to exist
given this reality is a question worth answering.216  The goal of effi-
cient environmental protection is arguably not being served when
government action often develops a middle ground of allowing
some degree of pollution to continue as long as government main-
tains control of the regulation.217  Citizens harmed by pollution
have repeatedly felt shortchanged by underwhelming state regula-
tion that bars private action, even where the state action falls short
of actually ending the harm to the environment.218  At least one
legal scholar argued citizen suits that merely mimic successful gov-
ernment enforcement are excessive and a waste of resources.219
The additional benefit to the environment would be minimal, at
least where a federal court simply levies a larger fine and places it
into a general treasury fund.220  This argument ignores the individ-
ual citizens harmed by environmental damage, who arguably de-
serve to be made whole in some manner.221  Further, given the
government’s tumultuous history of environmental protection, this
argument may actually show more support for abandoning govern-
213. See supra notes 113-210 and accompanying text (describing incidents of
government polluting environment and shielding polluters from liability).
214. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (examining legislative his-
tory to determine bar designed to make citizen suits secondary).
215. See supra notes 113-210 and accompanying text (elaborating upon gov-
ernment history of negligence and acquiescing in pollution).
216. See infra notes 217-251 and accompanying text (examining necessity of
diligent prosecution bar given flaws).
217. See, e.g., St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref.,
LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (E.D. La. 2007) (admitting continual violation of
EPA order but preventing suit from private citizen as government action had
commenced).
218. See id. (seeking increased action against defendant but prevented by gov-
ernment action).
219. See Appel, supra note 24, at 101-02 (arguing three reasons for citizen suits
being excessive on top of government action).
220. Id. at 101-02 (suggesting additional fines provide no additional benefit to
environmental causes).
221. See id. at 101 (failing to note outcomes for individual citizens or potential
damages claims for them).
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ment regulation of the environment entirely and leaving citizen
suits as the primary enforcement tactic.222
Given the legislative history for the environmental acts contain-
ing citizen suit provisions and the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of these bars, it seems unlikely the Court will abolish the diligent
prosecution bar anytime soon.223  The existence of the EPA and
many state level environmental agencies, constituting billions of
dollars of government spending, also indicates it is highly unlikely
the government will abandon environmental protection as a
goal.224  The courts have resoundingly found this as a proper role
of government.225  The circuit courts’ most recent interpretations
of the bars continue to narrow the grounds citizens can sue
upon.226  While the bar may remain, the courts can still take action
to provide clarity on the exact type of action constituting a bar and
provide a clearer pathway for citizen suits moving forward.227
The courts continue to struggle with the types of action consti-
tuting a bar under environmental statutes.228  One source of their
struggle is the instance where a consent decree is entered.229
Courts have struggled to define whether a citizen is suing for the
same action a consent decree has been entered for or whether the
action is a new instance of pollution allowing a citizen to sue.230
This is an important area for clarity as a citizen may continue to
endure harm from environmental damage if a court finds an ex-
222. See Jonathan H. Adler, Making The Polluter Pay, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC.
(Mar. 1, 1995), https://fee.org/articles/making-the-polluter-pay/ (suggesting
common law remedies provide better solutions to environmental pollution).
223. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987) (finding
legislative history supports bar making citizen suits secondary).
224. See generally Health and Environmental Agencies of U.S. States and Territories,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/home/health-and-environmen
tal-agencies-us-states-and-territories (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) (listing all environ-
mental agencies within country).
225. See Mississippi Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 182 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (finding Commerce Clause broad enough to allow regulation of envi-
ronmental danger).
226. Donald Shandy, Courts Narrow Citizen Suit Potential, AM. COLL. OF ENVTL.
LAWYERS (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.acoel.org/post/2016/02/18/Courts-Narrow-
Citizen-Suit-Potential.aspx (analyzing recent decisions as narrowing potential for
private right of action).
227. See Appel, supra note 24, at 92 (suggesting room to clarify principles of
law courts use to analyze diligent prosecution bar).
228. See id. at 102 (noting struggle of federal courts to decide meaning of
diligent prosecution bar).
229. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing courts jurispru-
dence in regards to consent decrees).
230. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (demonstrating level of
difference required for suit to be barred).
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isting order covers the environmental harm at issue, and they are
prevented from bringing action.231
Presenting further problems are areas requiring federal courts
to determine when a state is diligently pursuing an enforcement
action.232  One example exists in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services.233  The court examined facts such as Laidlaw
filing the complaint against itself, paying the filing fee to sue itself,
and arranging payment of penalty with the DHEC in one business
day.234  The District of South Carolina found none of these factors
inherently proved the prosecution was not diligent.235  The judge in
that case displayed a degree of discomfort in deciding the case,
though eventually arriving at the conclusion the prosecution was
not diligent.236  Legal scholars also note federal courts are in need
of guidance in this area.237  The Supreme Court should develop a
clear set of factors for courts, both federal and state level, to deter-
mine what constitutes diligent prosecution on the part of a govern-
ment.238  Clarity would help prevent judges from having to write
twenty-five pages of hesitant analysis, such as the judge in Friends of
the Earth.239
One scholar has suggested looking to other areas of law to help
create more clarity on whether a prosecution is diligent.240  Stem-
ming from an ideological basis of adequately representing citizens’
interests, the scholar suggests using rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for propriety of intervention as a standard.241
This rule allows a party to intervene in a suit unless their interests
are already represented in the suit, with the low burden to prove
their interests are not represented resting on the intervening
231. See, e.g., McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401,
1407-08 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (ruling preventing citizen suit despite ongoing harm).
232. See Appel, supra note 227, at 103 (describing federal court’s reluctance
with deciding state court issues).
233. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470
(D.S.C. 1995) (deciding whether DHEC action constitutes diligent prosecution).
234. See id. at 489 (detailing factual background for basis of decision).
235. Id. (finding facts insufficient alone to establish lack of diligent
prosecution).
236. See id. at 498 (qualifying decision to hold DHEC liable multiple times).
237. See Appel, supra note 24, at 108 (describing need for clarity moving
forward).
238. Id. (implying clearer standards would be helpful for future cases).
239. See generally Friends of the Earth, 890 F. Supp. at 474-98 (ruling against
DHEC with reluctance and detailed examination of legal background).
240. See Appel, supra note 24, at 108 (suggesting different area of jurispru-
dence could serve as model for diligent prosecution bar).
241. Id. (arguing parallels should be drawn to civil procedure rules).
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party.242  In the context of citizen suits, this standard could be used
to determine if a prosecution is diligent, though instead requiring
the defendant to prove the plaintiff’s interests are being repre-
sented in a prosecution, in lieu of the plaintiff bearing the burden
under the civil procedure rule.243  This standard would solve issues
of collusion between government and polluter, as the showing of
collusion would likely not constitute a diligent prosecution under
the standard.244  Other factors considered under the standard
would be the similarity of arguments between the citizens and gov-
ernment, whether the citizen and government share an interest,
and if the citizen could provide evidence the government neglected
to provide in its own action.245
The suggested standard would likely allow more citizen suits to
move forward and have their interests vindicated.246  This standard
is still rooted in the concept citizen suits should be secondary to
government action and the primary goals of a citizen suit should be
to achieve broader environmental goals.247  The diligent prosecu-
tion bar’s existence alone may necessitate courts interpreting the
bar in this manner.248  Despite this ideological basis for the bar, a
standard like the one suggested by the legal scholar may cut into
the collusion of government and polluter and properly vindicate
citizens harmed by the pollution.249  The best move would be for
courts to find a way to move away from treating citizen suits as sec-
ondary, given the history of government pollution and collusion,
and interpret the bar in a manner increasing the regulatory power
of private action.250  Though the diligent prosecution bar is here to
242. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (allowing outside parties to intervene in suit if
requirements are met).
243. See Appel, supra note 24, at 108 (describing how suggested standard
could function).
244. Id. (arguing collusion’s effectiveness to bar private claim would be less-
ened under suggested standard).
245. See id. at 109 (raising various considerations under potential new
standard).
246. See id. at 111 (speculating about effect of suggested change to
background).
247. See id. (stating ideological basis suggested standard is rooted in).
248. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987) (stating
legislative history supports citizen suits secondary role).
249. See Appel, supra note 24, at 108 (arguing collusion would be lessened
under suggested standard).
250. See supra notes 103-211 and accompanying text (describing reasons for
elimination of diligent prosecution bar).
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stay, courts should loosen the restrictions of the bar and allow more
citizen suits to move forward.251
Connor R. Adamson*
251. See supra notes 212-250 and accompanying text (assessing proposed solu-
tions to demonstrated issues created by diligent prosecution bar).
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S.J., Strategic Communications, 2016, West Virginia University.
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